Satisfaction with Democracy and Collective Action Problems: The Case of the Environment by Halla, Martin et al.
IZA DP No. 3613
Satisfaction with Democracy and Collective




























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
July 2008 
Satisfaction with Democracy and 
Collective Action Problems: 




University of Linz and IZA  
 
Friedrich G. Schneider 
University of Linz, CESifo, CREMA and IZA 
 
Alexander F. Wagner 











P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 














Satisfaction with Democracy and Collective Action Problems: 
The Case of the Environment
*
 
Using modern methods for analyzing multi-level data, we find that, by and large, citizens of 
OECD countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if more 
environmental policies are in place and if environmental quality is higher. We also document 
that parents care about carbon dioxide emissions more than non-parents and that those with 




JEL Classification:  K32, P16, Q21, Q28 
  
Keywords:  collective action problems, environmental economics and policy, 






Department of Economics 




E-mail: martin.halla@jku.at     
 
                
 
                                                 
* We would like to thank the Jubiläumsfonds of the Austrian National Bank, the Swiss Finance Institute, 
the University Research Priority Program Finance and Financial Markets at the University of Zurich, 
and the NCCR FINRISK for financial support. Alberto Alesina, Mathias Dufour, Gary King, and Pippa 
Norris provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. We also thank Elisabeth Christen, 
Claudia Kosovan, Silke Mader, and Jürgen Wegmayr for research assistance. 1 Introduction
In this paper we study how the resolution of an important economic problem – ensuring high
environmental quality – plays a role for how citizens perceive the quality and performance of
the economic and political system they live in. There is a lot of public discussion about the
importance of environmental issues, and it is evident that there is a greater popular awareness
for environmental problems today than some decades ago. What is much less known, however,
is: Just how important is the environment to individuals’ perception of the performance of the
regime they live in, taking into account that individuals also want to achieve other, potentially
conﬂicting goals such as economic prosperity? Answering this question is critical because most
environmental policies are costly. Therefore, their ultimate acceptance will hinge on the economic
value the public assigns to such policies.
Our approach to make progress on this question begins with the observation that collective action
problems, by their nature, tend to require collective solutions. Even though most individuals
recognize the social beneﬁts of enacting certain (market-based or rules-based) environmental
policies, individual considerations are likely to speak against such policies. In economic terms,
the marginal social beneﬁts of adopting environmental policies outweigh by far the marginal
individual beneﬁts (even though the latter vary across individuals). Importantly, rational indi-
viduals are aware of this wedge between what they know would be good for society, and what
the optimal individual course of action is. Thus, they know that environmental quality tends
to be undersupplied. Consequently, the main hypothesis that we test is that citizens yearn for
an eﬀective resolution of this dilemma. Because solutions are available only through a broad
consensus on policies, we recognize that the success a country has at tackling collective prob-
lems like the environment is a matter, among other things, of how well a political system works.
Therefore, we operationalize the research question by asking more speciﬁcally: Are citizens more
satisﬁed with the way their political system works when environmental quality is higher and/or
more environmental policies are established? And how much do they care compared to other
goals, such as personal or country-wide economic welfare?
To answer these questions, we choose as the dependent variable a direct measure of citizens’
views on the performance of their respective countries. This measure is ‘satisfaction with democ-
racy’ (SWD), a survey measure which is available for a wide range of countries. Satisfaction
with the way democracy works is not an indicator of system legitimacy per se. Rather, it is one
indicator of support for the performance of a democratic regime widely used in political science.
Survey measures such as life satisfaction and happiness are very popular in economic research
(see, among many others, Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004), Blanchﬂower and Oswald
(2004), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Gruber and Mullainathan (2005), Ng (2003), Oswald (1997),
Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003), and Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998)). By con-
trast, SWD has hitherto not been broadly applied by economists, despite comparable validity
and usefulness (Linde and Ekman, 2003); a recent exception is Wagner, Schneider and Halla
(2008). SWD does not attempt to capture whether people support the principles of democracy,
but rather how they judge it to work in practice in their concrete experience. It is a summary
indicator (Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 1993) that measures satisfaction with ‘the constitution in
2operation’ (Klingemann, 1999).1 As explanatory variables for SWD (besides standard individual
and country-level economic controls) we use a broad array of environmental policy and quality
variables. We calculate our estimates of the eﬀect of these country-wide environmental variables
on individual satisfaction with the best available econometric method.
We ﬁnd that environmental quality and policy matter to citizens in statistically and economically
important ways. Higher environmental quality and more comprehensive environmental policy are
associated with higher satisfaction with democracy. For instance, a reduction of CO2 emissions
by one ton per capita (the sample mean being about 9 tons per capita) increases SWD by the
same amount as shifting a citizen half a point up on the 10-point income scale. Similarly, the
introduction of an additional environmental policy measure (such as a general environmental
act) is on average associated with a rise in SWD equivalent to an increase in GDP per capita of
$1,000. The positive eﬀect of environmental quality and policy holds irrespective of the inclusion
of environmental taxes (which have no signiﬁcant eﬀect) and expenditures (which tend to have
a negative eﬀect). Our ﬁndings are robust to numerous controls on the country level and the
individual level, including environmental preferences. We also present evidence that parents
are more worried about high carbon dioxide emissions than non-parents, and that the SWD-
enhancing eﬀect of environmental policy is lower among citizens with a high willingness to pay
environmental taxes.
Other methods have been and could be employed to answer the question of how important the
environment is to individuals. For example, the rise of green parties in many democratic countries
indicates the increasing importance of environmental issues, and so tells us something about
the cross-country and time-series variation of environmental concerns. Still, in most countries,
the green parties receive only a fairly small number of votes in elections, and they have only
occasionally entered government. Moreover, votes for green parties are a highly noisy measure of
the importance of environmental issues to citizens, because individuals care about a broad array
of policy issues, but can only vote for one party.2 Rather than voting in the booth, people can
also vote with their feet (Tiebout, 1956). Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) ﬁnd support for this notion
in a study of how population densities in neighborhoods change when air quality changes.
Our results can also be interpreted as complementary to the existing, rich literature in economics
that has addressed the economic value of speciﬁc environmental amenities. Freeman (1985) and
EPA (2000) provide overviews of methods to measure how individuals value features of the
environment that they use, as well as those that they do not use. Standard methods include,
on the one hand, revealed preference methods and hedonic pricing (Viscusi, 1993; Bockstael,
Hanemann and Kling, 1987; Rosen, 1974), including those based on recreation demand estimation
(Bockstael and McConnell, 1983; Morey, Rowe and Watson, 1993), as well as, on the other hand,
1Some work following Anderson and Guillory (1997) has considered political system determinants of SWD, but
so far no study has considered the implications of speciﬁc policy measures. See Canache, Mondak and Seligson
(2001) for a critique of SWD and Anderson (2005) for a response.
2A vote share of 10 percent for a green party can, for example, indicate (a) that 10 percent of the population
care about environmental issues, (b) that 10 percent of the population prefer the other policies of the green party
even though these voters actually do not care about environmental policies, or (c) that in fact all of the population
care about the environment, but not enough to vote for the greens. Controlling for the various other inﬂuences is
not easy.
3stated preference methods.3 The latter set of methods, also known as contingent valuation, has
occasionally been under severe criticism from economists (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Portney,
1993; Hanemann, 1994; Diamond and Hausman, 1994).
Our dependent variable is also a survey measure, and as such it is, in principle, subject to the
same criticisms as any survey. However, in stark contrast to contingent valuation approaches,
the subjects we study answered the questions about their SWD independently of a speciﬁc policy
context. Thus, our approach does not require that the respondents are aware of any cause-eﬀect
relationship. It is not even necessary that respondents know the level of environmental quality.
Therefore, our approach is cognitively less demanding than contingent valuation and whatever
relationship we ﬁnd cannot be caused by strategic answers.
Perhaps closest to our study are some economics papers that have studied environmental qual-
ity (but not policy) as a determinant of happiness. Happiness is measured in these studies as
individual life satisfaction. This is, of course, an important dimension, but it is distinct from
satisfaction with the way democracy works. One line of work has considered speciﬁc environ-
mental amenities. For example, Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) use the happiness approach
to value airport noise. A second line of work studies broader environmental measures. Welsch
(2006) presents evidence that air pollution such as nitrogen, particles, and lead is negatively as-
sociated with subjective well-being for ten European countries (see also Welsch (2002)). Welsch
(2007) expands the analysis to a cross-section of 54 countries and calculates the marginal rate of
substitution of income for abatement. Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) examine the relationship
between climate and happiness in an empirical analysis using data of 67 countries. They ﬁnd
that happiness increases with higher mean temperature in the coldest month and decreases with
higher mean temperatures in the hottest month as well as that it decreases with a bigger number
of months with very little precipitation. Finally, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy (2007) study
the relationship between subjective well-being and individual environmental attitudes. Using
individual-level British data, they ﬁnd that concern about ozone pollution aﬀects individuals
happiness negatively, while concern for species extinction aﬀects subjective well-being positively.
Our ﬁndings on environmental quality are broadly consistent with these studies. However, our
results add to the existing literature in four important dimensions. First, this is the ﬁrst study,
to the best of our knowledge, to consider satisfaction with democracy as a measure of how much
individuals care about the environment. Because environmental problems are by their nature
collective problems, a measure of perceptions of the quality of the constitution in operation pro-
vides insight in addition to measures of individual well-being. Second, no study has evaluated
the relationship between environmental policy measures and any satisfaction variable. Policies
and quality may be related, but there may important time lags, and citizens’ evaluation of the
eﬀectiveness of the political system should take into account whether the right policies are in
place. Third, we estimate a multilevel (or hierarchical) model that explicitly models our two-
level data structure (individual and country). Economists studying the eﬀects of state polices
and institutions on individual outcomes (such as subjective well being) have long been aware that
applying standard OLS can result in underestimation of standard errors (Moulton, 1990). To ad-
3More speciﬁc methods are available for some environmental amenities; e.g., real options can be used to value
forestry investment (Insley, 2002).
4dress this, some researchers have used averaged data. However, this assumes homogenous policy
eﬀects, reduces the degrees of freedom substantially, and requires the cardinality of satisfaction
scores, making it a less than ideal method for the question under study. A much more powerful
approach is to account for the presence of clustered data by calculating robust standard errors.
We instead employ a multilevel model that explicitly models the error terms in the equations,
thus yielding diﬀerent point estimates, not only diﬀerent standard errors. Fourth, the richness
of our dataset and the multilevel analysis allows us to test for, and ﬁnd, policy eﬀects that are
heterogenous across individuals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section2 presents hypotheses, describes the data,
and discusses how our method diﬀers from, and hopefully improves on, approaches employed
in related studies. Section3 presents the main quantitative ﬁndings, and Section4 deepens the
analysis by studying heterogenous policy eﬀects. Section5 concludes.
2 Hypotheses, data, and methodology
We begin by deriving our hypotheses. We then discuss our dependent variable. Then, we present
our key explanatory variables, and our controls. Finally, we describe our estimation strategy.
2.1 Hypotheses
We test two simple ideas. Economic theory suggests that collective action problems are never
fully resolved. In particular, public goods such as environmental quality will generally be un-
dersupplied, i.e., social marginal beneﬁts will be greater than the social marginal costs even
when individual marginal beneﬁts and costs are already equated. Thus, even though there are
personal costs of improving the environment, people will generally expect that overall, more
environmental quality is part of a better-functioning democracy. Therefore, we hypothesize that
higher environmental quality leads to greater satisfaction with democracy. Citizens may also
expect from the ‘constitution in operation’ that it allows the government to provide (at least
partially) eﬀective ways towards a resolution of the collective action problem. Thus, we also test
the idea that environmental policy is generally seen as an important aspect of a well-functioning
democracy and will, therefore, also lead to more SWD. In sum, our two core hypotheses are:
Core Hypothesis 1: Countries with more environmental policy experience higher
SWD.
Core Hypothesis 2: Better environmental quality is associated with higher SWD.
2.2 Data
All our data, including the hand-collected items, will be available to other researchers upon
publication of this study. Detailed information on all data used can be found in the Data
appendix.
52.2.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable of our empirical analysis is a measure of SWD on an individual-level.
We observe data from the third wave of the European and World Values Survey (E/WVS).
This survey contains information on basic attitudes, beliefs and human values covering religion,
morality, politics, work and leisure. In particular, respondents are asked ‘On the whole are you
very satisﬁed, rather satisﬁed, not very satisﬁed or not at all satisﬁed with the way democracy
is developing in our country?’. We have information on more than 27,000 respondents from
24 OECD-member countries. The surveys were conducted within the time span from 1997
to 2001. Table1 gives an overview of the number of observations over years and countries.4
There is substantial variation across countries in terms of the overall, average level of SWD (see
Figure1). Luxembourg exhibits the highest SWD in the whole OECD, with a mean of 2.94.
Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada (all values above 2.7) also do very well in terms
of satisfying their citizens’ expectations towards democracy. Most of the large economies, such
as the United States, Germany and Great Britain have values above the OECD average of 2.49.
France and Japan, however, are below average. The group of countries with the highest levels of
average dissatisfaction (values below 2.3) are Italy, Czech Republic, Mexico, Hungary, Slovakia,
and Turkey. As we explain in separate sections further below, our results are generally not driven
by the least satisﬁed countries.
2.3 Environmental variables
We collect information from diﬀerent sources in order to capture environmental policy with
diﬀerent measures: (i) the existence of a wide array of certain policy measures, (ii) revenues
from environmental taxes as percentage of GDP, (iii) public expenditure on the environment as
percentage of GDP, (iv) and the share of votes for green parties. Descriptive statistics are in
Table 2.
Information on the existence of certain policy measures to protect the environment are collected
from Binder (2002). These policy measures essentially cover the full spectrum of environmental
regulation: from subsidies for renewable energy to environmental ministries, from environmental
labels to the existence of a nature conservancy act.5 We employ this information in two ways in
our multilevel analysis below. First, we deﬁne for each policy measure a binary variable which
is equal to one if a country had implemented this measure in a given year. For example, the
4As is apparent from the table, the dataset is largely cross-sectional. Ideally, we would have a true panel data
setup, such as (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005), which would then allow us to apply a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
approach, like (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), and . Unfortunately we face a tradeoﬀ that we cannot overcome
between the number of countries and the number of available years. For example, data from more years is available
in the Eurobarometer, but for far fewer countries.
5We read this information from the tables and graphs in Binder (2002). The full list of the 21 available
policy measures is as follows: quota for electricity from renewable energy sources (REG-quota), energy/CO2
tax, packaging rules, sustainability council, subsidy for electricity from renewable energy sources (REG-subsidy),
energy eﬃciency labels, environmental plan, ecolabels, environmental oﬃce, environmental expert council, general
environmental act, environmental reporting rules, waste disposal act, environmental protection as a constitutional
goal, nature conservancy act, soil protect act, environmental impact analysis, water protect act, clean air act,
environmental information act and ministry of the environment. A detailed description of each policy measure is
available upon request, but in most cases the variable names are self-explanatory.
6variable energy/CO2 tax is equal to one when a country had implemented an energy tax in a
given year and zero otherwise.6 Second, we calculate a summary measure, which is simply the
number of all implemented policy measures in a given year. It encapsulates the degree to which
a country has established a comprehensive set of environmental policy measures. It is apparent
from the descriptive statistics in column1 of Table2 that there is a tremendous variation in the
implementation of environmental policies across OECD member countries. The Netherlands had
implemented all 16 policy measures by 1999. Turkey comes in at the bottom of the ranking,
registering only 5 measures in 2001.7
The data on revenues from environmental taxes as percentage of GDP are from the joint database
of the OECD and the European Environment Agency on Instruments Used for Environmental
Policy and Natural Resources Management and data on the public expenditure on the environ-
ment as percentage of GDP are primarily from the the OECD database. Columns3 and 4 of
Table 2 provide an overview for these two variables. Notably, the level of public environmen-
tal expenditure is lower throughout than the revenues from environmental taxes. The revenues
from environmental taxes as percentage of GDP are in a range from 1.03% (United States) to
5.19% (Denmark). Of course, the capability of tax revenues (alone) to capture the degree of
environmental friendliness is limited. For instance, low revenues can either be due to little use
of environmental taxes, or due to a broad and eﬀective use of such taxes, where high tax rates
have altered the citizens’ behavior. However, when we employ this variable below, we control for
other environmental policy measures, allowing us to draw ceteris paribus conclusions.
Finally, we are interested in the relation between the share of votes for green parties and the level
of SWD. We want to explore the eﬀect of green parties on SWD with and without controlling
for other environmental policy measures. In this case we have a priori no clear hypothesis.
As Table3 shows, our environmental policy measures are moderately positively correlated, with
exception of environmental taxes and environmental expenditures (−0.170) and share of green
votes and environmental expenditures (−0.062).
To measure environmental quality we use data on (i) emissions8 and on (ii) road network
and traﬃc. In particular, we use data from the OECD Environmental Data, Compendium 2004
on emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile
organic compounds (VOC) and carbon dioxides (CO2). The main human sources of SOx are
burning fossil fuels, smelting and paper manufacture. SOx emissions cause adverse eﬀects on
respiratory systems of humans and animals, and damage to vegetation. In particular, they con-
6We exclude the variable measuring the existence of an environmental impact analysis since it takes on the
value one for each country. Moreover, we exclude the measures water protection act and clean air act since
Iceland is the only country which has neither a water protect act nor a clean air act. We have also excluded the
environmental policy measures environmental information act and ministry of the environment. Only Poland and
Turkey do not have an environmental information act and only Japan and the USA do not have a ministry of the
environment. The exclusion of these two variables helps convergence and speeds up the estimations.
7We also repeated all estimations with the variable summary measure2, see column2 of Table2, that also
includes the ﬁve measures (environmental impact analysis, water protect act, clean air act, environmental infor-
mation act and ministry of the environment) which we exclude in our binary variable approach (see below). The
results are not sensitive to the choice of the summary variable. These results are available upon request.
8Ideally, one would like to use the actually relevant impact for individuals. To the extent that we ﬁnd emissions
to be negatively associated with SWD, this eﬀect, therefore, also captures the positive non-use value of lower
emissions.
7tribute to acid deposition and thus have negative eﬀects on aquatic ecosystems. NOx emissions
– mainly due to the burning of fossil fuels at high temperatures – play an important role in the
production of photochemical oxidants and of smog, and contribute, together with SOx, to acid
precipitation. CO interferes with the absorption of oxygen by red blood cells an cause adverse
health eﬀects. Emissions of VOC are considered, along with NOx, to be the main precursors
of photochemical air pollution. Finally, man-made CO2 emissions are mainly due to burning of
fossil fuels. The World Health Organization reports that the atmospheric concentration of CO2
has increased by more than 30 percent since pre-industrial times. This disturbs the balance of
the earth’s radiative energy budget and is associated with an increase in the earth’s surface tem-
perature and related to eﬀects on climate, sea level rise and world agriculture. CO2 contributes
the largest share to global warming (OECD, 2004).
Our descriptive statistics in Table4 (columns1 to 5) show that the United States and Canada are
the biggest emitters among the OECD-member countries. These two countries can be found in
the top three in every category. Of course, the ranking is correlated with a countries’ economic
output. Poorer countries such as Mexico and Turkey have lower level of emissions. Japan,
Germany, and the Netherlands are examples of richer countries with remarkably low levels of
emissions in every category, except CO2. Sweden and France score very well in terms of low CO2
emissions.
Arguably, traﬃc plays a major role in day-to-day perceptions of environmental quality. To
capture the road network and quality of car traﬃc we employ the following variables: total
length of the road network, length of the motorways, the stock of passenger cars in use and the
stock of other motor vehicles in use (see Table4 columns6 to 9). This information is collected
from the OECD Environmental Data Compendium.
2.4 Control variables
2.4.1 Country-level
To control for various determinants of SWD other than environmental factors, we employ a set
of economic control variables. Our hypothesis is simple:
Hypothesis 3: Better economic performance is associated with higher SWD.
As proxies for the overall economic performance we use data on GDP per capita, GDP-deﬂator
and unemployment rates. Beyond these variables, it is questionable which economic variables
we should control for. After all, hardly any non-economist would seem to care directly for
government debt (except perhaps in extreme cases) or openness, to give but two examples.
2.4.2 Individual-level covariates
Since we measure SWD on an individual-level we can control for a set of demographic char-
acteristics, such as age, sex, marital status, number of children, education (captured by school
8leaving age), household income, size of place of residence and labor market status (employed, self-
employed, unemployed, out of the labor force). Table5 provides average values for all individual-
level covariates by country. For space reasons, the full descriptive statistics are omitted, but they
are available on request.
2.5 Method: multilevel analysis
Whenever researchers are interested in the eﬀects of state polices and institutions on individual
outcomes (such as SWD or subjective well being) the presence of multilevel data structure poses
a challenge to statistical analysis. In our speciﬁc case, to explore the eﬀect of environmental
policy and environmental quality on SWD, we have to deal with data measured on two diﬀerent
levels. While we observe SWD on an individual-level, we measure environmental policy and
environmental quality on a country-level.9 Moulton (1990) drew economists’ attention to the
fact that applying ordinary least squares in this setup can lead to standard errors that are se-
riously biased downward. Early work tried to meet this challenge by using averaged data. But
this ignores heterogeneity on the individual level and assumes homogenous policy eﬀects. More-
over, it reduces the degrees of freedom substantially and requires the cardinality of satisfaction
scores. Therefore, this method is not widely employed anymore. More recently, economists have
been using individual-level data and calculating Huber (1967)-White (1980) standard errors or
standard errrors robust to clustering (Froot, 1989; Williams, 2000). Robust standard errors are
model-agnostic. Like robust standard errors, multilevel models begin with the observation that
citizens are clustered in countries, and share within a certain country a speciﬁc mix of political
institutions, environmental policy and environmental quality. But in addition, multilevel models
aim to account for intraclass correlation by explicitly modeling the association between individu-
als in the same cluster.Through this, they imply a much stronger form of correction than simply
calculating so-called robust standard errors. Speciﬁcally, in contrast to the method of correcting
standard errors, a multilevel analysis corrects the denominator degrees of freedom for the num-
ber of clusters and will, therefore, yield diﬀerent point estimates, not merely diﬀerent standard
errors.10 In addition to methodological reasons there are also good substantive reasons to use
multilevel analysis. Most notably, it allows to explore so-called causal heterogeneity (Western,
1998). Speciﬁcally, in Section 4 we study cross-level interactions, and check whether the eﬀect
of certain policy measures on satisfaction with democracy varies across diﬀerent subgroups of
citizens.
We start with a random intercept model, including control variables on an individual and a
9In fact, we would prefer individual-level data for environmental policy and environmental quality, but this
sort of data does not exist, at least not in a dataset that measures individuals’ SWD.
10The terms cluster-sample model, hierarchical linear model, mixed-eﬀect model and mixed model are synonyms
for multilevel models, though the use has been somewhat inconsistent in the literature. This class of models has a
long tradition in educational science and bio-statistics. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) give an excellent overview
and illustrate why such models are highly valuable for empirical research in economics and political science.
Rice and Jones (1997) presents an introductory account of multilevel models and describes applications in health
economics. See also UCLA: Academic Technology Services (2008). Wooldridge (2003) and Wooldridge (2006)
provide a more technical discussion with an emphasis on ﬁxed eﬀects (which are not directly relevant for our
study due to the nature of our data setup).
9country level to explore mechanisms operating at both levels,
SWDij = β1 + β2xij + ζ1j + εij
= (β1 + ζ1j) + β2xij + εij.
(1)
where ζ1j ∼ (0,ψ) and εij ∼ (0,θ). The time-constant or permanent error component ζ1j varies
only between countries j. The transitory error component εij varies over citizens i and countries
j. The sum of these two terms, ξij = ζ1j +ij, is called the total residual. The random-intercept
model can be viewed as a model with a country-speciﬁc intercept β1 + ζ1j, where ζ1j is called a





This within-country correlation measures the ‘closeness’ of citizens from the same country relative
to the closeness of individuals from diﬀerent countries.
It is straightforward to include country-level covariates wj:
SWDij = β1 + β2xij + β3wj + ζ1j + ζ2jxij + εij
= (β1 + ζ1j) + (β2 + ζ2j)xij + β3w1j + εij.
(3)
Our dependent variable SWD is measured on a four-point scale. To take account of the ordinal
data type, we estimate a multilevel proportional-odds models.11
3 Estimation results
3.1 Individual and country-level characteristics
We begin with an estimation including only our control variables in order to verify that they
yield the expected signs (see Table6, column (I)). As regards the individual-level characteristics,
it is worth noting we ﬁnd very robust eﬀects. That is, the qualitative and quantitative results
concerning the demographic covariates are very similar in all estimations. This is in contrast to
other studies (e.g. Anderson and Guillory, 1997). We suspect that our superior method yields
these more robust results.
Substantively, we ﬁnd that females have a lower level of satisfaction with democracy (minus 0.06
points).12 Married citizens are on average more satisﬁed (plus 0.11 points). Interestingly, parents
are considerably less satisﬁed with democracy (minus 0.19 points per child). The coeﬃcients of
the variables capturing the individual economic situation are all statistically signiﬁcant and
show the expected sign. Unemployed citizens are – compared to employed citizens – less satisﬁed
(minus 0.30 points). As expected, satisfaction rises with household income. An increase in income
one the ten-point scale by one is associated with an increase in SWD by 0.06 points. Citizens
11For details see Chapter5 of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005).
12It is outside the scope of this paper to determine whether this may be explained by discrimination of women
in various aspects of live, such as the labor market, but this would appear to be an important question for further
research.
10out of the labor force have a comparable higher level of SWD (plus 0.11 points). This result
makes sense since we control for income. The citizen’s age, his or her level of education and the
size of his or her place of residence have no statistically signiﬁcant impact on SWD. Somewhat
surprisingly, self-employed individuals are less satisﬁed with the way democracy works.
The results for the country-level characteristics are also very robust and statistically signiﬁcant
throughout. Moreover, they show the expected sign: GDP per capita (positive), GDP-deﬂator
(negative) and unemployment rate (negative).
3.2 The need for a multi-level model
The estimated intraclass-correlations ρ, shown in the second to last row in the tables, imply
that between 5% and 9% of the total variance in SWD can be explained by information on
the country-level. To judge whether this data structure necessitate a multilevel estimation, we
calculate the design eﬀect, deﬁned as 1+(average cluster size−1)∗ρ. A design eﬀect greater than
2 indicates that the clustering in the data needs to be taken into account (Muthen and Satorra,
1995). Even for our lowest observed intraclass-correlation we get a design eﬀect of about 57
(= 1+(1,128−1)∗0.05). Ignoring the multi-level nature of the dataset simply is not an option.
3.3 Environmental policy
Columns (II) to (V) of Table6 provide the estimates for regressions including all the individual
policy measures. Of course, many of them are correlated, but this horserace nonetheless allows
a ﬁrst understanding of the impact of policy on SWD. A few individual policy measures seem to
have a consistently positive eﬀect on SWD, in particular, a quota for electricity from renewable
energy sources, packaging rules, the existence of a general environmental protection act, environ-
mental protection embodied in the constitution, and a soil protection act. An energy and CO2
tax is in principal also favored by citizens, however not when controlling for the level of general
environmental spending and environmental taxes. By contrast, citizens deplore the existence of
environmental oﬃces, and there is some evidence that ecolables are negatively associated with
SWD. It is hard to rationalize these two speciﬁc ﬁndings, and we need to leave them as some-
what puzzling results that may arise simply as an artefact due to the correlations between the
many policy variables included in the horserace. The ﬁrst two rows of Table 6 (as well as results
from regressions available on request that do not include individual policy variables) indicate
that higher general environmental taxes and higher environmental spending are greeted either
neutrally or unfavorably by citizens.
Of course, an estimation with sixteen related explanatory variables may obscure a more general,
common link between environmental policy and SWD. Therefore, Table7 looks at the relation-
ship between our summary measure of environmental policy and SWD. The strong and robust
result that emerges is that, controlling for a large variety of individual and country-level explana-
tory variables, a more developed environmental policy is applauded by citizens. The summary
measure enters as a highly statistically signiﬁcant determinant of SWD. The implementation of
11an additional environmental policy measure increases SWD by nearly 0.05 points. This quan-
titative eﬀect is fairly important compared to the gender-gap in SWD (about 0.06), and it is
equivalent to about two thirds of a one point jump up on the 10 point income scale (about 0.06).
Comparing the results in column (I) with those in the columns (III) and (IV) of this table, an-
other interesting observation emerges: While policy itself is strongly positively related to SWD,
citizens seem to favor it especially when it comes with low expenditures. Both environmental
taxes and expenditures enter with a negative sign, where the latter is highly statistically signiﬁ-
cant. (The correlation between policy and taxes is positive but not very high, see Table3.) The
point estimates imply that an increase in environmental expenditure (measured as the share of
GDP) by a half percentage point is associated with a decrease in SWD by 0.06 points, i.e., by ap-
proximately the same amount by that an additional environmental policy would increase SWD.
The positive coeﬃcient on the summary measure and the negative coeﬃcient on environmental
expenditures are consistent with an economic understanding of environmental problems as col-
lective action problems, i.e., with the notion that most individuals care about the environment
but few are willing to pay the costs to protect it.
In a next step we incorporate the share of votes for green parties in the most recent national
(parliamentary) elections. Column (I) in Table8 indicates that the vote share of green parties
per se is not related to SWD.13 When including environmental policy measures, however, green
parties are positively related to SWD (see column (II)). This ﬁnding suggests that citizens appear
to value green parties as playing a role for SWD in addition to (or possibly independent of) their
potential role in pushing for environmental policy measures. This result also holds when we use
the summary measure, as in column (III). Notably, the results on the eﬀect of environmental
policy (measures) on SWD remain unchanged when controlling for the share of votes for green
parties. This is important because the vote for green parties could be interpreted as a measure
of environmental preferences.
Overall, we ﬁnd substantial support for the the hypothesis that environmental policy enhances
SWD.
3.4 Environmental quality
The second hypothesis that we test is that environmental quality should have a positive impact
on SWD. Table9 shows the results for this hypothesis, ﬁrst introducing measures of the road
network and traﬃc, then introducing various emissions, and then including all measures. A
number of interesting ﬁndings emerge from studying the variables both individually and jointly.
Consider ﬁrst the relationship between traﬃc and SWD. Column (I) implies that the number of
passenger cars is, by itself, positively related to SWD. However, column (III) shows that traﬃc
has no eﬀect when controlling for emissions. This is consistent with an economic understanding
of the role of traﬃc: Individuals beneﬁt from transportation, but they do take into account the
negative impact on the environment. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that documents
this ambiguous eﬀect of traﬃc on a measure of self-perceived welfare. For the average citizen,
other measures of road network and traﬃc do not have a negative impact on SWD.
13For space reasons, we omit the control variables in the presentation, but they retain the same signs as before.
12A similar insight can be gleaned from the eﬀects of emissions. Column (II) suggests that NOx and
CO2 aﬀect SWD negatively (as expected), while VOC has a positive eﬀect. But both the puzzling
positive eﬀect of VOC and the plausible negative eﬀect of NOx are not robust to controlling for
the road network and traﬃc, as can be seen from column (III). These emissions are correlated
with SWD-enhancing mobility factors.
The strongest – and especially topical – result is that individuals are substantially less satisﬁed
with the way democracy works when CO2 emissions are higher. An additional ton of CO2 per
capita (where the sample mean is about 9 tons per capita) decreases SWD by about 0.02 points.
This is quantitatively comparable to a third of the gender-gap in SWD we documented earlier.
Notably, this eﬀect is robust to controlling for the various measures related to traﬃc (and for
the other individual and country-level economic controls).
3.5 Robustness to sample choice
As is apparent from Figure 1, Slovakia and Turkey have particularly low SWD scores. To
check the robustness of our results not only to speciﬁcation but also to sample choice, we ran
all estimations omitting these two countries. For space reasons, we cannot replicate all the
tables here, but the results are available on request. The overall picture that emerges is that
our main ﬁndings are not driven by these two countries. Instead, as one might expect from a
typical sample, some of the results are stronger without Turkey and Slovakia, while others are
weaker. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that: (1) the summary measure of environmental policy still remains
strongly positively signiﬁcant in the vast majority of estimations; (2) environmental expenditures
and (when controlling for the summary measure of environmental policy) environmental taxes
are more strongly negatively associated with SWD than before; (3) some of the individual policy
measures switch signs, and their inclusion occasionally makes the coeﬃcient on environmental
taxes positive, a result that is hard to rationalize; (4) the results on traﬃc become stronger in
that an extensive road network is positively associated with SWD, while the number of cars is
occasionally negatively associated with SWD; (5) CO2 emissions continue to be the only type of
emissions robustly associated with SWD; their eﬀect is strongly negative. None of the emissions
have a positive eﬀect.
4 Heterogenous environmental preferences
Citizens’ preferences over environmental issues may not only diﬀer across countries but also
within countries. Heterogenous preferences result in a diﬀerential willingness to pay for envi-
ronmental quality (and, thus, for policy). In this section, we integrate heterogenous views over
environmental issues in our analysis. To do this, we extend our multilevel model and include
cross-level interactions to explore so-called causal heterogeneity (Western, 1998). We study two
types of heterogeneity. First, we consider preferences for the environment based on survey ques-
tions directly. Second, we consider whether parents diﬀer from non-parents in their assessment
of the importance of environmental policy for a well-functioning economic and political system.
134.1 Hypotheses
4.1.1 Environmental preferences
The theoretical impact of stronger environmental preferences is ambiguous: One hypothesis is
that those with stronger preferences for the environment derive greater satisfaction from more
developed environmental policies. The alternative hypothesis is that those with a higher will-
ingness to pay (both ﬁnancially or in terms of time invested for the environment) may deplore
the fact that government has to step in with more extensive policy measures. In particular, they
would be willing to pay themselves, rather than have government do so (especially because the
government’s actions may distract attention from other topics the citizen really wants govern-
ment to get involved in). If environmental quality is a good for all citizens, then those who do
not wish to pay for it themselves will feel more satisﬁed with more policy and more governmental
spending than those who would be willing to pay themselves. Which of the two eﬀects dominates
is, therefore, an empirical question.
Hypothesis 40 (Null): The impact of environmental policy and quality on citizens’
SWD increases with their environmental preferences.
Hypothesis 4a (Alternative): The impact of environmental policy and quality on
citizens’ SWD decreases with their environmental preferences.
To test these two competing hypotheses, we consider two measures of environmental preferences.
First, we employ information on the individual willingness to make ﬁnancial sacriﬁces for the
sake of environmental protection. Respondents were asked whether they agree strongly, agree,
disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements,
(I) I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent
environmental pollution.
(II) I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental
pollution.
These measures of willingness to pay are coded as WTP I and WTP II, respectively. Table10
shows the percentage of respondents from each country who strongly agree or who at least agree
with each of these statements. As expected, the two measures are highly positively correlated. On
average citizens from Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and (perhaps especially interestingly)
Greece claim to have high willingness to pay for environmental quality. Perhaps surprisingly, the
average citizen in countries such as Spain, France, and Germany has a very low stated willingness
to pay.
Our second measure of environmental preferences draws on the notion that being prepared to
make direct ﬁnancial sacriﬁces for the sake of environmental protection may not be the only
indicator for environmental preferences. Instead of donating money, individuals can also donate
time by engaging in private pro-environment behavior such as recycling, forgoing facilitating
14but environmentally harmful commodities, attending public meetings or volunteering for pro-
environmental organizations. All of these bring opportunity costs with them, and consequently
are well suited for our hypotheses tests. In the E/WVS, respondents were asked whether they
belong to any voluntary organization concerned with conservation, environment, or animal rights,
and also if they are currently doing unpaid voluntary work for such an organization (see Table11).
Based on these two questions we deﬁne two variables capturing (i) being a member of any pro-
environmental organization and (ii) being a volunteer of any pro-environmental organization. It
is a priori not clear whether donating money and time are complements or substitutes. In our
sample, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between the two, suggesting that they are complements.
4.1.2 Parents
Many environmental problems are inherently long-term challenges. A purely selﬁsh individual
might simply not care about what happens after he or she dies. Even rational economic models
frequently assume, however, that individuals have a bequest motive, as they think about the
welfare of their oﬀspring. If individuals expect environmental problems to mainly concern the
next generations, not their own, this would suggest that those with children should care more
about environmental policy.
Hypothesis 5: Parents’ SWD reacts more strongly to environmental policy and quality
than SWD of non-parents.
4.2 Results
To operationalize causal heterogeneity with respect to environmental preferences we interact our
measures of environmental policy and quality with the variables capturing environmental pref-
erences on an individual-level. Econometrically, the two variants of Hypothesis 4 imply that
for each interaction term between the policy and quality measures and the preference variable
dummy we expect a signiﬁcant eﬀect with a positive sign (in case of the null hypothesis) or a
negative sign (in case of the alternative hypothesis). Hypothesis 5 unambiguously implies that
for each interaction term between the policy and quality measures and the parents dummy vari-
able we expect a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient. Table12 provides results showing the eﬀect
of our environmental policy measures on SWD across our sub-groups of citizens with diﬀerent
environmental preferences. Table13 summarizes the estimation results with environmental qual-
ity as the key variable of interest. Recall that emissions are negatively related to environmental
quality, and the coeﬃcients therefore need to be interpreted in the opposite manner as those for
the policy variables. In both sets of estimations all non-binary variables that are interacted are
centered around their mean. Figure2 summarizes some of the results graphically.
Table12 (perhaps surprisingly) shows that citizen with high environmental preferences have a
considerably lower baseline level of SWD: volunteers (minus 0.14 points), club members (minus
0.11 points), citizen with a high WTP I (minus 0.11 points) and parents (minus 0.19 points).
With the exception of column (III), including measures of preferences for the environment does
15not alter the primary ﬁnding that environmental policy is associated with greater SWD. We
ﬁnd no evidence that the marginal eﬀect of environmental policy on SWD is greater for those
with stronger environmental preferences, contradicting Hypothesis 40. For instance, according to
column (I), an additional environmental policy measure increases SWD of volunteers and non-
volunteers alike by about 0.05 points. This is depicted in the top left panel of Figure2. However,
columns (III) and (IV) provide some evidence in favor of Hypothesis 4a: An additional policy
measure increases citizens’ SWD with a low WTP II by about 0.05 points, while the eﬀect for
their counterparts with a high WTP II is only 0.02(= 0.05 − 0.03) points. This is shown in the
top right panel of Figure2. That is, the marginal impact of environmental policy on citizens’
SWD decreases with their willingness to pay for environmental issues.
In interpreting these results, recall that SWD is not a measure of support for a particular party
or for the government. Nonetheless, this result is important from a policy, and from a political
perspective: Support for environmental policies is unlikely to come from those who are willing
to incur personal costs for improving environmental quality.
The results on environmental expenditures and taxes are mixed. We do not observe heterogenous
eﬀects of environmental expenditures or taxes on SWD across citizens with varying environmental
preferences. However, the overall eﬀect of environmental expenditure on SWD changes when
controlling for environmental preferences. In the estimations above we observed that SWD
decreases with higher environmental expenditures. Interestingly, with the new control variables
for environmental preferences, environmental expenditures now seem positively related to SWD,
in the case of pro-environmental behavior (columns (I) and (II), and insigniﬁcantly so in the case
of the measure WTP II (column (IV)) and the child dummy (column (V)).
We can also improve our understanding of the eﬀect of environmental quality by including envi-
ronmental preferences. Table13 ﬁrst implies that the most robust result obtained so far – that
CO2 aﬀect SWD negatively – is primarily due to parents. We plot the relationship between CO2
and SWD separately for parents and non-parents in the bottom left panel of Figure2. This result
is highly intuitive, but this paper is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst to document that citizens’ views
on climate change as a problem may vary markedly, and predictably, according to whether they
have children or not. Much as in the case of policy, willingness to pay plays an important role:
Those with a high WTP are less worried about CO2 in terms of their SWD – perhaps because
they believe that addressing climate change is not so much a societal, but an individual-level
problem. This is shown in the bottom right panel of Figure2.
For the other emissions, we ﬁnd somewhat confusing results. For example, in the light of the
result that those with a high WTP are more satisﬁed with higher CO2, it is not clear why the same
individuals are also less satisﬁed with high NOx emissions. When controlling for environmental
preferences, we also observe some changes with respect to the eﬀect of road network and traﬃc on
SWD. Speciﬁcally, now other vehicles (such as trucks) do have a statistically signiﬁcant negative
impact on SWD in each speciﬁcation. When controlling for a high WTP I (column III) we ﬁnd
further that individuals appear to prefer fewer in-land roads, but more motorways (highways).
This is not a ﬁnding we expected a priori, and further research could proﬁtably be conducted
16into exactly what sort of transportation network is most consistent with citizens’ preferences.14
Overall, these results do not unambiguously provide support for either set of hypotheses on
heterogenous policy and quality eﬀects. In some sense, this is not surprising, given the broad
array of variables that we use to proxy for environmental preferences. Conversely, in the presence
of a number of non-robust results, it is noteworthy that the result for willingness to pay and the
(intuitive) ﬁnding for how the role of CO2 varies for parents and non-parents arises in virtually
all speciﬁcations.
4.3 Robustness to sample choice
We again ran all estimations excluding Slovakia and Turkey (results available on request). Over-
all, when controlling for environmental preferences in this reduced sample, the results for envi-
ronmental policy remain very similar as before. As for environmental quality, there seems to be
a neutral or, in some speciﬁcations, a slightly positive association between SWD and CO2 emis-
sions for the average citizen. But the ﬁndings on causal heterogeneity go in the same direction as
before: Speciﬁcally, we can conﬁrm that in the reduced sample those with a higher willingness to
pay again tend to deplore environmental policies more and tend to appreciate CO2 emissions less
than those with a lower willingness to pay. We also again ﬁnd support for parents appreciating
CO2 emissions less than non-parents. As before, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects for
the other environmental quality and preference variables.
5 Conclusion and policy implications
This paper investigates citizens’ satisfaction with the ability of states to solve collective action
problems. As an especially important and topical collective action problem we study the envi-
ronment. In particular, we explore the relationship between environmental policy and quality
and reported satisfaction with democracy in 24 OECD countries. Our ﬁrst set of new results
shows that, by and large, both a focus on environmental policy and higher environmental quality
(in terms of lower emissions, in particular, of CO2, and less traﬃc) increase satisfaction with
democracy in statistically and economically important ways. Higher public expenditures on the
environment tend to decrease an average citizen’s satisfaction score. This dual result conﬁrms
the public good characteristics of environmental policy and environmental quality.
The multi-level model that we employ to obtain these results is superior to all other methods
that have so far been applied to study related questions on how country-wide variables aﬀect
individuals. Because it uses more information and models the relation between individuals within
countries more carefully than standard approaches, the results should be more reliable. Perhaps
the primary limitation of this study is that it does not exploit time series variation. With the
existing data, this is not possible as the surveys are not conducted with the same individuals
14We might speculate, for example, that one factor behind the result we ﬁnd may be that being able to bridge
large distances fast is something most value highly (thus requiring motorways), while the general and smaller
road network is seen, on balance, as a negative. This may be, among other reasons, because these roads often cut
through the countryside.
17every year. As such, our results still have uncertainties, which of course leaves much work for
future generations of scholars to pursue.
A second set of novel ﬁndings arises when we account for environmental preferences. The overall
insights we obtain are somewhat mixed. Despite the economically intuitive and statistically
strong set of results for some environmental policy and quality variables, not all the regressions
paint the same picture. This is simultaneously disappointing and comforting: It is disappointing
because it limits policy implications to a subset of the possible measures. It is comforting because
a complex phenomenon such as the environment is highly unlikely to have unambiguous eﬀects
on all dimensions that we observed through our many measures. Too clear results would raise
our suspicion. What we do ﬁnd to be robust results are the following: ﬁrst, those with a high
willingness to pay do not appreciate environmental policy as much as those with a low willingness
to pay; second, parents worry signiﬁcantly more about CO2 emissions (and thus, presumably,
about climate change) than those citizens without children.
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216 Data appendix
The information on the individual-level on satisfaction with democracy, age, sex, marital
status, children, education, household income (measured on a ten-point scale), size of the place
of residence (measured on a three-point scale) and employment status (employed, self-employed,
unemployed and out of the labor force) is from the European and World Values Survey (E/WVS).
In particular, we use the European and World Values Surveys Four-wave Integrated Data File,
1981-2004. We have selected all OECD-member countries for which a measure of satisfaction
with democracy is available, except for Portugal and South Korea. Portugal had to be excluded
since information on household income was available on a six-point scale only. We excluded
South Korea since no comparable information on environmental policy was obtainable. Our
sample of estimation consists of all observations from respondents from these OECD-member
countries for which information on these basic individual characteristics was available. (Table1
shows the number of observations over years and countries.)
A special comment is in order for the measurement of education. The E/WVS includes two
questions on education: (i) ‘What is the highest educational level that you have attained?’ and
(ii) ‘At what age did you (or will you) complete your full time education?’. While the former
question would be preferable to measure the level of education, there are considerably more
missing answers compared to the latter one. In order to exploit all the available information on
education and to save observations we construct a variable capturing the actual or the regular
school leaving age. In particular, if information on the second question was available we used
it. In the cases where the answer on the second question was missing, but information on the
ﬁrst question was available we have imputed the regular school leaving age of the respective
educational level. We distinguished two cases: (i) If there was information on both questions for
other respondents from the same country and year available, we have imputed the average school
leaving age among those with the same highest educational level attained. (ii) If there where no
respondents from the same country and year available with information on both questions we
imputed the regular school living age of the respective educational level. Full details are available
upon request.
The primary source for the macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP-deﬂator and
unemployment rate) is the OECD Factbook 2007. However, for Iceland (1999), Mexico (2000)
and Turkey (2001) no information on unemployment rates was available and we retrieved this
information from the OECD database (on 10/30/07).
Our measures of environmental policy are from diﬀerent sources. First, information on the
existence of a quote for electricity form renewable energy sources (REG-quota), an energy/CO2
tax, a packaging rules, a sustainability council, a subsidy for electricity from renewable sources
(REG-subsidy), energy eﬃciency labels, environmental plan, ecolabel, UVP, environmental in-
formation act, an environmental oﬃce, an environmental expert council, a general environmental
act, environmental reporting rules, a waste disposal act, environmental protection as a consti-
tutional goal, a ministry of the environment, a nature conservance act, a water protection act a
soil protection act, a clean air act is collected from (Binder, 2002). We obtained the information
by reading them from the graphs. The graphs are fortunately of the quality that they allow the
unambiguous identiﬁcation of all cases. Second, the data on revenues from environmental taxes
as percentage of GDP is from the joint Database of the OECD and the European Environment
Agency on Instruments Used for Environmental Policy and Natural Resources Management. The
Eurostat database includes an equivalent variable for all EU-member countries. The correlation
between these two variables for the countries/years data points which are included in both sources
is 0.985. In order to construct the variable on governmental expenditure on the environment as
percentage of GDP we primarily used data from the OECD Database. In particular, we derived
the variable as the share of total government expenditure for environment protection of GDP
22(both measured in national currency at current prices). We imputed the missing information on
expenditures for the year 2000 with data from the year 1999. For Poland (1999), Slovakia (1999)
and Turkey (2001) we use data from the Eurostat Database. In order to construct an equivalent
variable for Canada (2000), Czech Republic (1999), Hungary (1999) and Mexico (2000) we had to
rely on respective national sources. Details are available upon request. (All data from databases
was retrieved on 11/1/07)
The main source of information on the green parties is from the web-page of the European
Green Party. From there we retrieved information on the share of votes of green parties in
the latest national parliamentary elections for Austria, Belgium (sum of two parties), Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands (sum of two parties), Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
(sum of two parties). The equivalent information for Canada, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Turkey
and the United States is obtained from the respective national web-sites. For example, for the
US we use the popular vote share for Ralph Nader in the year 1996. (Details are available upon
request.)
Our measures of environmental quality are from two primary sources. Firstly, the information
on emissions of SOx, NOx, CO, VOC and CO2 from energy use is collected from the OECD
Environmental Data, Compendium 2004. For Mexico and Turkey no data is available on SOx,
NOx, CO and VOC for the years 2000 and 2001. We imputed the missing values with the latest
information available. For Mexico we use data from the year 1998 and for Turkey from the year
2000. For Luxembourg we had to impute the missing value of VOC for 1999 with data from the
year 1998. Secondly, the information on the road network (total length of road networks, length
of motorway networks) and on the stock of road vehicles (total number of passenger cars in use,
total number of other motor vehicles in use) is obtained from the OECD Environmental Data,
Compendium 2006/2007. There is no information on the length of the motorway network in
Iceland included. However, Chris’s British Road Directory reports that there are no motorways
in Iceland. For Canada (1999) we used the latest available information on the total length of
road networks from the year 1995.
237 Appendix
Table 1: Number of available observations per country and year.
1997 1999 2000 2001
Austria 0 1,163 0 0 1,163
Belgium 0 1,399 0 0 1,399
Canada 0 0 1,619 0 1,619
Czech Republic 0 1,673 0 0 1,673
Denmark 0 847 0 0 847
Finland 0 0 789 0 789
France 0 1,191 0 0 1,191
Germany 1,645 1,507 0 0 3,152
Great Britain 0 560 0 0 560
Greece 0 877 0 0 877
Hungary 0 913 0 0 913
Iceland 0 815 0 0 815
Ireland 0 737 0 0 737
Italy 0 1,380 0 0 1,380
Japan 0 0 1,021 0 1,021
Luxembourg 0 535 0 0 535
Mexico 0 0 920 0 920
Netherlands 0 899 0 0 899
Poland 0 966 0 0 966
Slovakia 0 1,177 0 0 1,177
Spain 0 753 830 0 1,583
Sweden 0 604 0 0 604
Turkey 0 0 0 1,160 1,160
United States 0 1,101 0 0 1,101



























































Figure 1: Satisfaction with democracy in OECD-member countries. The numbers on
top of the bars show average SWD, while the numbers in parentheses after country names show
standard deviations.
24Table 2: Summary of environmental policy measures.a
Summary Summary Environ. Environ. Share of
measure measure 2 taxes expend. green votes
Austria 1999 11 16 2.32 0.43 7.40
Belgium 1999 8 13 2.41 0.72 14.50
Canada 2000 7 12 1.39 0.86 0.80
Czech Republic 1999 9 14 3.03 0.48 1.10
Denmark 1999 12 17 5.19 0.65 0.30
Finland 2000 12 17 3.18 0.31 7.30
France 1999 12 17 2.55 0.62 5.10
Germany 1997 9 14 2.19 0.70 7.30
Germany 1999 12 17 2.29 0.74 6.70
Great Britain 1999 11 16 3.21 0.58 1.40
Greece 1999 10 15 3.11 0.51 0.00
Hungary 1999 12 17 3.21 0.62 0.60
Iceland 1999 7 10 3.30 0.00 9.10
Ireland 1999 10 15 2.95 0.45 2.80
Italy 1999 11 16 3.34 0.77 2.50
Japan 2000 12 16 1.71 1.71 0.00
Luxembourg 1999 9 14 2.95 1.18 9.10
Mexico 2000 10 15 1.72 0.50 4.02
Netherlands 1999 16 21 3.76 0.87 7.40
Poland 1999 12 16 1.94 0.83 0.00
Slovakia 1999 10 15 2.00 0.71 2.50
Spain 1999 9 14 2.31 0.88 0.70
Spain 2000 9 14 2.13 0.71 1.10
Sweden 1999 14 19 2.89 0.16 4.50
Turkey 2001 5 9 3.57 0.27 0.00
United States 1999 8 12 1.03 0.00 0.71
10.27 15.04 2.68 0.63 3.73
a Summary measure is the number of all implemented policy measures in a given year which we
consider in the our binary variable approach. These comprise the existence of a quote for electricity
form renewable energy sources (REG-quota), an energy/CO2 tax, a packaging rules, a sustainability
council, a subsidy for electricity from renewable sources (REG-subsidy), energy eﬃciency labels,
environmental plan, ecolabel, an environmental oﬃce, an environmental expert council, a general
environmental act, environmental reporting rules, a waste disposal act, environmental protection
as a constitutional goal, a nature conservance act, and a soil protection act. Summary measure
2 also includes the ﬁve measures (environmental impact analysis, water protect act, clean air act,
environmental information act and ministry of the environment) which we exclude in our binary
variable approach. Environmental taxes are the revenues from environmental taxes as percentage
of GDP. Environmental expenditure are the share of total government expenditure for environment
protection of GDP (both measured in national currency at current prices). Share of green votes
are the share of votes for green parties in the latest national parliamentary elections. Detailed
information on all sources can be found in the Data appendix.
Table 3: Correlation of environmental policy measures.a
Summary Summary Environ. Environ. Share of
measure measure 2 taxes expend. green votes
Summary measure 1
Summary measure 2 0.983 1
Environ. taxes 0.256 0.253 1
Environ. expend. 0.280 0.298 -0.170 1
Share of green votes 0.057 0.079 0.017 -0.062 1



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 10: Willingness to pay for environmental quality.a
Percentage of respondents who
strongly agree with at least agree with
statement statement
(I) (II) (I) (II)
Denmark 30.1 22.7 79.5 66.9
Sweden 23.3 28.7 79.5 79.1
Netherlands 16.0 10.3 75.3 56.5
Greece 28.6 18.8 82.5 65.0
Czech Republic 17.4 9.9 78.0 66.1
Luxembourg 23.8 19.9 64.5 57.7
Mexico 27.5 15.3 81.1 58.8
Iceland 9.8 7.2 63.6 58.4
United States 16.4 12.3 69.4 61.3
Japan 10.9 7.8 71.8 64.4
Canada 17.3 11.6 70.2 60.8
Turkey 22.2 12.9 76.5 56.0
Belgium 17.8 11.8 60.5 46.7
Poland 15.4 11.1 61.6 52.3
Finland 10.2 9.0 56.4 53.1
Great Britain 9.1 8.2 52.1 54.1
Ireland 9.3 6.9 56.6 42.2
Italy 10.8 7.1 67.3 44.8
Austria 9.0 6.4 49.7 39.1
Slovakia 15.1 9.0 57.4 40.7
Spain 12.5 9.2 58.3 48.6
France 14.2 10.2 48.2 39.7
Hungary 12.9 7.5 54.2 34.0
Germany 5.2 8.4 28.5 46.1
Mean 16.0 11.8 64.3 53.9
N 24,575 26,251 24,575 26,251
a Sorted by average over all four categories. (I) I would give part of
my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent
environmental pollution. (II) I would agree to an increase in taxes if
the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution.
32Table 11: Pro-environmental behavior.a
Share of respondents engaged
with an environ. organization
N as a member as a volunteer
Netherlands 966 45.4 2.8
United States 1,101 15.3 8.4
Greece 913 11.1 10.0
Denmark 847 13.8 2.2
Luxembourg 920 9.3 5.6
Belgium 1,399 11.0 3.1
Sweden 1,160 10.6 3.5
Austria 1,163 9.6 2.1
Canada 1,619 7.8 4.0
Czech Republic 1,673 6.8 3.2
Great Britain 877 1.4 8.4
Mexico 899 5.3 3.2
Finland 789 5.3 2.8
Iceland 737 5.0 1.5
Germany 3,137 4.5 1.4
Italy 1,021 3.8 1.7
Slovakia 1,583 2.6 2.0
Japan 535 3.1 1.4
Ireland 1,380 3.1 1.4
Hungary 815 1.9 2.0
Spain 604 2.0 1.0
France 1,191 2.1 0.9
Poland 1,177 1.6 0.7
Turkey 560 0.2 0.2
Mean 7.6 3.1




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Tons of CO2 per capita 
SWD 
No. of env. policy measures 
0.179 
Non-volunteers, s = 0.05 
Volunteers, s = 0.05 
0.083 
Low WTP I, s = - 0.033 
High WTP I, s = - 0.011 
No. of env. policy measures 
Low WTP II, s = 0.05 
High WTP II, s = 0.02 
0.141 
Non-parents, s = 0 
Parents, s = - 0.02 
Tons of CO2 per capita 
SWD 
SWD 
Figure 2: Heterogenous eﬀects of environmental policy and quality on SWD. The
diﬀerence in the intercepts and slopes are calculated based on the results from columns (I) and
(IV) of Table12 and columns (I) and (V) of Table13, respectively. The top left panel shows that
volunteers and non-volunteers care about environmental policy in the same (positive) way. The
top right panel indicates that those with a low willingness to pay derive higher marginal beneﬁts
in terms of SWD from more environmental policy than those with a high marginal willingness
to pay. The bottom left panel shows that parents worry more about CO2 emissions than non-
parents. The bottom right panel shows that those with a high willingness to pay worry less
about CO2 emissions than those with a low willingness to pay.
36